The security implications of social bots are evident in consideration of the fact that data sharing and propagation functionality are well integrated with social media sites. Existing social bots primarily use RSS (Really Simple Syndication) and OSN (Online Social Network) APIs to communicate with OSN servers. Researchers have profiled their behaviors well, and have proposed various mechanisms to defend against them. We predict that a web test automation rootkit (WTAR) is a prospective approach for designing malicious social bots. In this paper, we first present the principles of designing WTAR-based social bots. Second, we implement three WTAR-based bot prototypes on Facebook, Twitter, and Weibo. Third, we validate this new threat by analyzing behaviors of the prototypes in a lab environment and on the Internet, and analyzing reports from widely-used antivirus software. Our analyses show that WTAR-based social bots have the following features: (1) they do not connect to OSN directly, and therefore, produce few network flows; (2) they can log in to OSNs easily and perform a variety of social activities; (3) they can mimic the behaviors of a human user on an OSN. Finally, we propose several possible mechanisms in order to defend against WTAR-based social bots.
INTRODUCTION
Online social networks (OSNs) such as Facebook, Twitter, and Weibo are widely used on the Internet. They are changing the way people communicate and interact with the Internet [1] . Due to the popularity of OSNs, attackers have begun designing malicious software that targets OSNs. These new social botnet programs have become serious security threats to social networks in recent years.
A popular new attack toolkit called RIG is affecting accounts on Twitter, Facebook, and other social media websites. According to Cisco threat researchers 1 , the RIG must register basic profiles. Some OSNs, such as the Chinese Weibo platform require real name authentication for full access to the service or else actions will be limited.
In addition, the number of APIs that can be called is Second, we present the principles of designing WTARbased social bots. Third, we implement three WTARbased bot prototypes on Facebook, Twitter, and Weibo.
Fourth, we validate this new threat from three perspectives:
analyzing prototypes in a lab environment, running the prototypes on the Internet, and analyzing reports from widely used antivirus software. Thus, we hope to provide experience for other security researchers to facilitate better understanding of the depth and scope of the threats posed by this new breed of social bot.
The main contributions of our work are as follows.
( The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 presents related work. Section 3 discusses the key challenges in designing a successful social bot. Section 4 describes the WTAR design principle, including WTAR enabling factors, an overview of WTAR, C&C structure, C&C procedures, command encryption, host activities, and social network activities. Section 5 gives a WTAR case study. Section 6 validates the WTAR theory from three perspectives, i.e., analysis in a lab environment, running on real social networks, and detection by antivirus software.
Section 7 compares WTAR-based social bots to early social bots, describes a possible defense mechanism, and discusses limitations of the mechanism. Conclusions are given in Section 8. [18] give an overview of key challenges in defending against social bots. The challenges relate to web automation, online-offline identity binding, and usable security. In this paper, we draw more attention to the challenges of web automation, utilizing the WTA technique to solve the problems of web automation in social bots.
RELATED WORK

KEY CHALLENGES
We present the key challenges faced by attackers in designing successful malicious social bots. 
Graph-based detection
Graph theoretic techniques are expected to be less effective and more expensive at identifying social bots. Community detection algorithms [37] [38] are deemed to fail because there will be far more fake relationships than social bots [2] . Guanhua Yan et al. [35] If the master commands need a feedback dataset, WTARs can upload the desired data to a server in M2. These servers are set up beforehand by the botmaster, and can be changed at any time.
DESIGN PRINCIPLE
Enabling factors for WTAR
C&C structure
To extend the social botnet for large-scale infiltration of OSNs, we introduce three different structures, as shown in Figure 2 . The letter M represents the bot master, B represents a compromised social bot, and MB means that the node acts as both a social bot and the bot master.
The first structure, shown in Figure 2(a) , is the simplest.
It seems similar to an IRC botnet with traditional bot design. In such a structure, all social bots communicate with one bot master. The bot master account on the target OSN is the key factor in social botnet defense. If one social bot has been detected and its communication decrypted, the bot master may be found out and blocked by the OSN vendors. Without the bot master, the other social bots can be destroyed automatically.
Another structure is shown in Figure 2 Among the three types of structures, the first one is simple and easy to destroy. However, it is also easy to rebuild, and the communication between a bot and the master is fast and convenient. The third type of structure is the most stable and robust. It is hard to destroy, but it is complex and hard to maintain.
C&C procedure
To After parsing the encrypted commands, WTARs launch corresponding attacks. 
Algorithm 1 Fetch commands algorithm
Command encryption
In order for the C&C of WTAR to avoid detection, the command encryption procedure should be efficient and have good steadiness. We design the commands in three aspects: unique command, encrypted command, and confused command. Table II Table II . The number of host activities is extensible by updating the host activities module of WTAR.
Social network activities
The special social network activity for social bots makes them different from traditional bots. Facebook, "tweets" on Twitter, and "weibos" on Weibo.
Hence, we need to design modules for different OSNs and make social activities exclusive to particular OSNs. Table III The social commands are not limited to the five shown in Table III . As with host activities, the number of social activities is extensible by updating the social activities module of WTAR. The WTA technique is not limited to the framework described above. PAMIE, the framework used in our designed prototypes, is not complex. The packaged executable file of our prototypes is small and can run on any Windows XP or Windows 7 system without any other WTA environment. It is a malicious file only on the end host. Moreover, the prototypes can be injected into other benign applications. We believe other more robust social bots can be implemented with our proposed designing principle. While our subject is not to design a perfect social bot, we hope to help researchers understand social bots from the perspective of attackers and propose more effective approaches for social bot detection. We have shared the prototypes via Dropbox.
CASE STUDY
VALIDATION
In this section, we validate the threat from WTARs in three aspects. Section 5.1 discusses the experiment in the lab.
Section 5.2 discusses the experiment conducted on a real network. Section 5.3 shows the antivirus reports regarding the three prototypes.
Experiments in the lab
To analyze the three prototypes on a host, we capture the system API and monitor the overhead in the lab. In the experiment, a controllable local network is built. Windows 7 systems are installed on user hosts. They have been equipped with quad core 2.40GHz CPU and 2G RAM. We run Wbbot, Fbbot, and Twbot separately. After the command finishes, IE exits and the memory usage for IE drops to zero. CreateFile  1153  1235  805  RegOpenKey  656  584  548  RegQueryValue  363  284  366  CloseFile  355  349  399  RegQueryKey  275  194  221  RegCloseKey  263  282  195  ReadFile  221  258  242  QueryDirectory  166  146  165  QueryStandardInformationFile  116  110  102 System call. We use Process Monitor to monitor the system calls that these prototypes have called when they are running. The total number of network flows is calculated over time.
Through analyzing the network flow dataset, we found that the processes of WTAR-based bot produce a few network flows. When the same prototype runs the same commands in different occasions, the increases in flow rate for them are very similar. Figure 6 shows a ten-minute log, and the rate at which flow increased over time. In the figure, the start time is corrected. Time is plotted on the x-axis, and the total flow number is on the y-axis. Figure 6 
Real world experiments
To validate the real threat of WTARs, we operated ten prototypes of Fbbot on Facebook for two weeks. Prior researchers also use this mechanism to design malicious applications. Wang et al. [25] presented a novel attack method that allows attackers to reliably hide malicious behavior in an app on iOS devices. Once the app was published and installed on an end-user's device, it can be required to carry out the intended attacks. Yazan et al. [2] operated their social botnet on Facebook and collected data about user behavior.
We create ten prototypes of Fbbot and a single bot 
PROFILING
In this section, we compare our WTARs with prior social bots, discuss the defense mechanism for WTAR, and describe the limitations.
Comparison
Comparison with Nazbot. 
Countermeasures
In this section, we discuss possible countermeasures On the server-side, we can use the page-view graph.
All WTAR-based social bots need to refresh the latest commands from the master account in a random time This can be considered as cofactors for detecting the processes of WTAR.
Limitations
Our proof-of-concept social bot has a number of implementational limitations. We focus on two of them:
bootstrap and large data test in the real Internet.
We do not pay much attention to the bootstrap phrase of WTAR. We focus on the C&C, command encryption, host activities, and social network activities. Thus, our prototypes should be run manually, or the threat of WTAR will be killed automatically if the host has been shut down.
However, we believe WTARs can be easily extended if good bootstrap mechanisms are used.
We have not carried out a large data test in the real network. Our prototypes only carry out a few activities in the Internet. We only collect a 14-day data set from Fbbot on Facebook and only autoAdd command is verified. The finally acceptance rate of friendship requests is not high.
But we believe that if the WTARs have a better promotion, and the base number of victim hosts is large enough, WTARs can be used to build up a large social botnet.
CONCLUSION
Social bots have become a security threat to both users and service providers of OSNs. prior social bots, discuss the possible defense mechanism for WTAR, and describe the limitations of our WTAR.
We believe that social bots on OSNs represent only one of the many emerging cyber threats. The first step to defend against such a threat is to understand how social bots are designed and how they work. With the experience of designing WTAR, we hope to help defenders propose novel approaches to detect social bots in the future.
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